Do Option-like Incentives Induce Overvaluation?
Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets by Holmén, Martin et al.
Do Option-like Incentives Induce Overvaluation?
Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets
Martin Holmeny, Michael Kirchlerz, and Daniel Kleinlercherx
Abstract
One potential reason for bubbles evolving prior to the nancial crisis
was excessive risk taking stemming from option-like incentive schemes in
nancial institutions. By running laboratory asset markets, we investigate
the impact of option-like incentives on price formation and trading behav-
ior. We observe (i) that option-like incentives induce signicantly higher
market prices than linear incentives. We further nd that (ii) option-like
incentives provoke subjects to behave dierently and to take more risk
than subjects with linear incentives. We nally show that (iii) trading at
inated prices is rational for subjects with option-like incentives since it
increases their expected payout.
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1 Introduction
The role of specic compensation structures of nancial market participants has
become a highly discussed issue since the unfolding of the nancial crisis in 2007-
2008. It has been argued that bubbles in several markets were caused by ex-
cessive risk taking which stemmed from bonus payment systems and option-like
compensation structures in nancial institutions (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010;
Dewatripont et al., 2010; French et al., 2010; Gennaioli et al., 2012). According
to Rajan (2006), one of the main origins of instability in highly developed -
nancial markets are widely used convex incentives structures.1 He argues that,
compared to the 1970s, the reduced downside and the strongly increased upside
potentials of investment managers' compensation create stronger incentives to
take risks.
From the 1970s onwards, many investors started to delegate their portfolio
to nancial professionals. In general, this delegation of individuals' investment
portfolios to nancial professionals results in asymmetric information and cre-
ates a moral hazard problem (Allen, 2001). To solve the problems of moral
hazard, various mechanisms are used to align the interests of the investment
manager (agent) and the investor (principal). The most common mechanisms
in the nancial industry are bonus payments and option-like incentive contracts
(Allen and Gorton, 1993; Kritzman, 1987). However, Rajan (2006) argues that
managerial incentives are not always aligned with the investors' interests and
these misalignments may result in distortions on nancial markets.
Allen and Gorton (1993) model this agency problem theoretically. In their
model the investment manager does not share the losses but receives a propor-
tion of the prots.2 They report \rational bubbles", as the convex incentive
structure induces the investment manager to trade at prices far above funda-
1We use \option-like" and \convex" synonymously throughout the paper.
2Allen and Gorton (1993) and Cuoco and Kaniel (2011) argue that this type of compen-
sation is widely used in the investment industry. Call-option type contracts are widespread
in the hedge fund industry as well (Goetzmann et al., 2003). Another strand of literature ex-
amines how commonly observed incentive contracts impact portfolio managers' decisions (see
e.g. Basak et al. (2008)) and Grinblatt and Titman (1989). These studies mainly examine
how incentive contracts may aect the portfolio managers' risk preferences.
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mentals. This problem is similar to the risk-shifting problem in Jensen and
Meckling (1976) where corporations' shareholders obtain any upside potential
but do not bear the full downside risk because of limited liability. Consequently,
even risky negative net present value projects may be attractive for the share-
holders. Likewise, Allen and Gale (2000) examine how intermediation by the
banking sector leads to a similar agency problem which also results in asset
bubbles.
Although these nancial incentives are nowadays one of the major trading
motives of nancial professionals, little is known about the consequences of con-
vex incentives on price formation in asset markets.3 Only James and Isaac
(2000) and Isaac and James (2003) investigate price formation in experimen-
tal markets under tournament incentive structures. They show that moderate
overvaluation emerges under tournament incentives for all traders.
We run laboratory experiments to examine price formation and trading be-
havior under two dierent compensation structures. Inspired by Allen and Gor-
ton (1993) and Rajan (2006), we address the following questions:
Research Question 1: Do option-like incentives trigger dierent price dy-
namics than linear incentives?
Research question 2: To what extent do option-like incentives change traders'
behavior?
To answer the research questions, we implement two dierent incentive
structures. In the rst two treatments (Treatment LINEAR and Treatment
CONVEX) we either apply a linear or a convex incentive structure for all sub-
jects. In a third treatment (Treatment HYBRID) we endow half of the subjects
with linear incentives and half of the subjects with convex incentives. The goal
of this treatment is to analyze whether already a lower fraction of subjects with
convex incentives induces dierent price dynamics and whether subjects with
dierent incentives behave dierently when competing in the same market.
3The impact of many dierent factors on price formation has been investigated especially in
laboratory asset markets. The most prominent drivers of mispricing are lottery assets (Ackert
et al., 2006), speculation (Lei et al., 2001), confusion (Kirchler et al., 2012), and positive
liquidity shocks (Caginalp et al., 1998, 2001; Haruvy and Noussair, 2006).
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We observe (i) signicantly higher market prices when subjects are incen-
tivized with option-like incentives than with linear incentives. We further show
that (ii) option-like incentives induce subjects to behave dierently and to take
more risk than subjects with linear incentives. Finally, we report that (iii) trad-
ing at inated prices is rational from an individual perspective since it increases
the expected payout of option-like incentivized subjects. However, overvalued
prices are harmful for the real economy as prices no longer reect the assets' fu-
ture cash ows and therefore prevent the ecient allocation of scarce resources.
2 The Experiment
In each market ten subjects trade assets of a ctive company for experimental
currency (Taler) in a sequence of twelve periods of 120 seconds each.4 At the
beginning of each market subjects are endowed with 40 assets and 2000 Taler.
Valued at the expected cash-ow, i.e., expected terminal dividend (ED), of 25
each subject's initial wealth is 3000 Taler in each treatment. Taler and asset
holdings are carried over from one period to the next. No interest is paid on
Taler holdings and there are no transaction costs.
2.1 Experimental Treatments
To achieve comparability it is necessary to set up the treatments in a way that
expected earnings are identical across treatments. In particular, the incentive
structures in all treatments are modelled such that the expected earnings of
a risk-neutral hold strategy are EUR 15. Table 1 presents an overview of the
treatment abbreviations and parameters.
Treatment LINEAR endows all subjects with a linear incentive structure.5
4To avoid end of experiment eects, subjects were told that the experiment will be termi-
nated randomly between periods 8 and 15 with equal probability. In the rst market, period
12 was chosen randomly and therefore we sticked to this ending period in all other markets.
5In all treatments a cash-ow (i.e., similar to periodic payments of the company) of either
2 or 0 Taler with equal probability is paid out for each unit of the asset after each period.
After deducting holding costs of 1 for each unit the expected value of the sum of cash-ows
and holding costs equals zero.
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Table 1: Treatment parameterization.
LINEAR CONVEX HYBRIDa
Terminal dividends 15; 65 15; 65 15; 65
Probabilities of the terminal dividends 80%; 20% 80%; 20% 80%; 20%
Expected terminal dividend (ED) 25 25 25
Incentive structure linear option-like linear; option-like
Strike (Taler) { 3000 { ; 3000
Fixed payment (EUR) { 8 { ; 8
Bonus payment (Taler/EUR) 100/0.5 100/2.1875b 100/0.5; 100/2.1875b
Expected payo of a hold strategy (EUR) 15 15 15
Periods 12 12 12
Assets outstanding 400 400 400
Initial total asset value of the market 10,000 10,000 10,000
Initial cash in the market 20,000 20,000 20,000
Initial Cash/asset-ratio 2 2 2
a One half of the subjects is endowed with linear incentives, the other half with convex incen-
tives.
b Only for the amount of wealth in Taler which exceeds the strike of 3000 Taler.
Terminal dividends of the tradable asset are either 15 or 65 with probabilities
of 80% and 20%, respectively. The payos given a hold strategy are either EUR
13 (Wealth is calculated as the sum of 40 assets multiplied by 15 and 2000 Taler
in cash. To arrive at the payout in Euro wealth is divided by the exchange rate
of 200.) or EUR 23 under the two dierent terminal dividends. By multiplying
both payouts with the probabilities for each state of nature, we arrive at the
expected earnings of EUR 15.
Treatment CONVEX endows all subjects with a convex incentive structure.
In particular, the option-like payment kicks in at a wealth level of 3000 Taler
(similar to an \at-the-money" Call option).6 The xed payment is EUR 8 and
the bonus payment (slope of the payo function in Figure 1) is set to EUR
2.1875 for every 100 Taler in wealth exceeding 3000 Taler. If a subject holds the
6Typically, the compensation structures in the investment industry include two main com-
ponents (Cuoco and Kaniel, 2011). One component is linearly or non-linearly related to the
performance of the portfolio. The other component is linearly related to the absolute value
of the managed portfolio. However, net investment ows are less sensitive to past returns
when these are bad and much more sensitive when performance is good (see e.g. Brown
et al. (1996), Chevalier and Ellsion (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Thus, the second
compensation component is implicitly convex in performance as well. Therefore, our simple
convex incentive structure mimics the compensation structure of investment managers on real
markets. Of course, traders on real markets face other social, legal and moral consequences
that we cannot model in our experiment. However, the isolation from a specic real-world
context is typical for all kinds of laboratory work. It might even be less relevant in market
experiments as social preferences are less important and therefore do not inuence results (see
the discussions in Levitt and List (2007) and Al-Ubaydli and List (2012)).
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initial portfolio and a terminal dividend of 15 is realized, she receives EUR 8, as
nal wealth of 2600 Taler does not exceed the strike of 3000 Taler. Instead, if
a terminal dividend of 65 is drawn nal wealth equals 4600 Taler which results
in a payo of EUR 43 ((4600{3000)*2.1875/100 + EUR 8).
Treatment HYBRID endows ve subjects with the linear incentives of Treat-
ment LINEAR and ve subjects with the convex incentives of Treatment CONVEX
in each market. Subjects knew that other subjects in the market were incen-
tivized dierently, but they were not aware of the precise incentive structure of
the others and the number of subjects being incentivized dierently. Figure 1
displays the two incentive structures used in the various treatments.
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Figure 1: Incentive structures of subjects either being endowed with linear
incentives (left) or with convex incentives (right).
2.2 Market Architecture
Subjects trade in a continuous double auction with open order books (see the
Appendix for a screenshot and a detailed explanation of the trading screen).
Firstly, all orders are executed according to price and secondly, time priority.
Market orders have priority over limit orders and are always executed instan-
taneously. Any order size, the partial execution of limit orders, and deleting of
already posted limit orders are possible. Shorting assets and borrowing money
is not allowed.
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2.3 Experimental Implementation
Six markets were run for each treatment. All 18 markets were conducted at the
Universities of Gothenburg and Innsbruck with a total of 180 students (bach-
elor and master students in business administration and economics). Three
markets of each treatment were run at each University.7 Each subject partici-
pated in only one market and we made sure that subjects did not participate
in earlier asset market experiments of comparable design. The markets were
programmed and conducted with z-Tree 3.2.8. by Fischbacher (2007). Subjects
were recruited using ORSEE by Greiner (2004). In total, each experimental ses-
sion lasted approximately 75 minutes, including 20 minutes to study the written
instructions, three trial periods and the main experiment. Average earnings of
the experimental subjects were EUR 15.6.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptives
Figure 2 shows volume-weighted period prices of individual markets (grey lines)
and mean treatment prices (bold line with circles) over time. Table 2 out-
lines mean market prices and asset overvaluation (OV) as a percentage of the
expected terminal dividend (ED).8 With a median OV of -0.2% Treatment
LINEAR exhibits ecient prices which are almost identical with the ED. In-
stead, when a convex incentive structure is applied, we observe strong me-
dian overvaluation of 50.9%. With a value of 25.5%, median overvaluation in
Treatment HYBRID is located between Treatment LINEAR and Treatment
CONVEX.
7We nd no dierences in results between Universities for the market variables investigated
below.
8We dene overvaluation (OV) as the percentage deviation of prices from the expected
terminal dividend (ED).
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Figure 2: Expected terminal dividend (ED, bold line), mean treatment prices
(bold line with circles) and volume-weighted mean prices of individual markets
(grey lines) as a function of period. Upper panel: Treatment LINEAR { all
traders are incentivized with a linear incentive structure. Middle panel: Treat-
ment CONVEX { all traders are endowed with a convex incentive structure.
Bottom panel: Treatment HYBRID { half of the traders is incentivized linearly
while the other half is given convex incentives.
8
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for mean market prices and overvaluation (OV).
Treatment Market Mean Price OV(%)
LINEAR 1 33:33 33:3%
2 24:51  1:9%
3 25:25 1:0%
4 22:24  11:1%
5 37:86 51:5%
6 24:66  1:4%
Median 24:96  0:2%
CONVEX 1 40:18 60:7%
2 35:32 41:3%
3 34:02 36:1%
4 40:14 60:5%
5 32:51 30:1%
6 44:29 77:1%
Median 37:73 50:9%
HYBRID 1 26:86 7:4%
2 34:88 39:5%
3 33:73 34:9%
4 30:41 21:6%
5 32:32 29:3%
6 27:02 8:1%
Median 31:37 25:5%
3.2 Research Question 1
To answer the rst research question whether option-like incentives lead to dif-
ferent price levels than linear incentives, we run pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests.
Table 3: Pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests for overvaluation (OV) between the
dierent treatments. Absolute dierences in OV in percentage points (pp) and
p-values in parenthesis are provided. Sample size N of each test equals 12.
Treatments CONVEX HYBRID
LINEAR 51:1 25:7
(0:0250) (0:2001)
CONVEX 25:4
(0:0163)
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1%
signicance levels of a double-sided test.
One can see from Table 3 that there is a signicant dierence in OV be-
tween Treatment LINEAR and Treatment CONVEX. However, due to the high
variance of individual market results for OV, HYBRID is statistically indif-
ferent from LINEAR, but shows a signicantly lower value of OV compared
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to CONVEX. Thus, convex incentives generate price dynamics that lead to
signicantly higher prices. Furthermore, a fraction of 50% of subjects with
convex incentives is already sucient to drive prices considerably away from
the expected terminal dividend. Hence, research question 1 can be answered
positively.9
3.3 Research Question 2
To answer the second research question whether subjects' behavior changes
when incentivized dierently, Treatment HYBRID is most suitable since sub-
jects with both incentive structures trade in the same market environment.
We nd that subjects who are incentivized with convex incentives show a
markedly dierent trading behavior and take on more risk compared to sub-
jects with linear incentives.10 We derive our results from a LS-regression with
clustered standard errors on a market level:
yj = + 1CONV EXj + j : (1)
The binary dummy CONV EXj is 1 if subject j is endowed with a convex
incentive structure, zero otherwise. yj is a generic placeholder for the depen-
dent variables STOCK, MONEY, PFRISK, and ACCRATIO. For the variables
STOCK and MONEY we take the median in asset and cash holdings from pe-
riod 8 to 12 of subject j, respectively. This serves as reliable proxy for subjects'
nal endowments, as the experiment can be terminated beginning in period 8.
We apply the same approach for variable PFRISK which measures the absolute
dierence in portfolio wealth between the high state and the low state of the
9The Appendix provides details on other descriptive market variables. Share turnover
(ST ) is applied as a measure of trading volume, the average bid-ask-spread as a percentage
of the ED in the market (SPREAD), and the standard deviation of log-returns (SD RET ) as
a proxy volatility in the various markets. However, we detect no signicant dierences in any
of the investigated variables.
10We ran a risk aversion test before the experiment and we found no signicant dier-
ence between the two subgroups. Therefore, all observe dierences are due to the incentive
structure.
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buyback price. With this variable we measure the riskiness of each subject's
portfolio. In particular, a low number hints at a low-risk portfolio while a high
number points at a risky portfolio with major investments in the risky asset.
Finally, ACCRATIO serves as a proxy for the cautiousness of subjects and is
dened as the number of all posted market orders of subject j divided by the
total number of her posted limit orders (Kirchler et al., 2011). For instance,
a high value of acceptance ratio indicates a more immediate and risky trading
behavior. Table 4 outlines the results.
Table 4: LS-regression for dierences in behavior between subjects with either
convex or linear incentives in Treatment HYBRID.
STOCK MONEY PFRISK ACCRATIO
 27:93 2375:13 1396:67 0:52
(4:51) (11:47) (4:51) (4:43)
CONVEX 22:86  718:42 1143:33 1:31
(1:76) ( 1:66) (1:76) (1:75)
N 60 60 60 60
Dependent variables: STOCK: median stock holdings of subject j from period 8 to
12. MONEY: absolute median money holdings of subject j from period 8 to 12.
PFRISK: median dierence of the portfolio value in case of a high buyback price and
in case of a low buyback price of subject j from period 8 to 12. ACCRATIO:
acceptance ratio of subject j (market orders divided by limit orders). z-values are
given in parentheses. CONVEX: binary dummy showing 1, if subject j is
incentivized with a convex incentive structure, zero otherwise.
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signicance levels of a double-sided
test.
First, one can see from column STOCK that subjects with convex incentives
hold signicantly more stocks in their portfolio. While subjects with linear
incentives only hold 28 stocks, those endowed with convex incentives hold 51
towards the end of the experiment.11
Second, we nd the opposite eect for endowments in cash as outlined in
column MONEY. Subjects with linear incentives hold on average 2375 units
of cash, while subjects with convex incentives show signicantly lower money
holdings by 30% towards the end of the experiment.
Third, we report that subjects with convex incentives have a signicantly
11Note that with endowments being calculated as the median of each subject, numbers do
not necessarily sum up to on average 40 stocks and 2000 in cash.
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riskier portfolio composition than subjects with linear incentives (see column
PFRISK). The dierences are strong in magnitude as portfolio risk of option-like
incentivized subjects is more than 80% higher compared to the one of linearly
incentivized subjects.
Fourth, subjects show dierences in their cautiousness to trade (see column
ACCRATIO). In particular, the acceptance ratio of subjects with a convex
incentive structure is more than 2.5 times higher compared to subjects with a
linear incentive structure. This indicates that subjects with convex incentives
actively seek to maximize their expected payout by a rather impatient and risk
seeking trading behavior.
To sum up, subjects directly respond to the applied incentives and show
signicantly dierent trading patterns, which answers research question 2 ar-
matively.
3.4 Discussion
The goal of this section is to analyze whether the observed prices are a rational
response to the dierent incentives. Therefore, we detecte the trading price at
which individual subjects are indierent between buying and selling assets, i.e.
the subjects' reservation price (RP), under dierent incentives. We assume that
the representative agent j maximizes his expected prot. We further assume,
for the sake of simplicity, that the representative agent does not make net cap-
ital gains from trading and therefore the volume-weighted average price of all
purchases equals the volume-weighted average price of all sales. So, pj is the
average trading price of agent j.
In Treatment LINEAR, the Taler value of the cash position of agent j at
the end of the market is equal to 2000 + (40  n)  pj where n is the number of
assets held at the end. The Taler value of her asset position is nj di where di is
the terminal dividend in state i (either low or high). The expected Euro payo
E(Payo)j of agent j can be written as,
12
E(Payo)j =
1
FX
2X
i=1
i(2000 + (40  nj)pj + nj  di); (2)
where FX is the exchange rate Taler to Euro and i stands for the probability
of the terminal dividend di in state i. If the average trading price is above
(below) 25, the expected payo to a net seller increases (decreases) and the
expected payo to a net buyer decreases (increases). Thus, the representative
agent has no incentives to acquire (sell) assets at prices above (below) 25 since
this would reduce his prots. Thus, 25 will be his reservation price with linear
incentives.
In contrast, Equation (3) shows the expected Euro payo E(Payo)j for the
representative agent under a convex incentive structure (Treatment CONVEX):
E(Payo)j = 8 +
1
FX
2X
i=1
i(max[0; 2000 + (40  nj)pj + nj  di   3000]): (3)
It is evident from equation (3) that option-like incentives trigger dierent
price dynamics of the reservation price compared to linear incentives. Figure
3 plots the expected payo (E(Payo)j) as a function of the average trading
price pj for asset end holdings nj (in steps of ve) from zero (dashed line)
to 120 (bold line) of agent j in Treatment CONVEX. At low (high) average
trading prices, large (low) end holdings of the asset dominate low (high) end
holdings. For instance, if the market price equals the ED of 25, the agent has
incentives to acquire as many assets as possible (end holdings of 120 dominate
all lower end holdings at a price of 25). In particular, the average trading price
at which agent j is indierent between being a net-purchaser and a net-seller is
39.40. Consequently, 39.40 is the reservation price (RP) which results in OV of
57.6%.12
12Note, that a benchmark for Treatment HYBRID would be within the boundaries of 25.00
and 39.40. However, nding a clear-cut benchmark would be problematic as any values within
the boundaries would be arbitrary and solely rely on the modelling assumptions of both
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Figure 3: Expected payo in EUR of agent j (E(Payo)j) as a function of
agent j 's average trading price under various end holdings (nj) of the asset in
Treatment CONVEX.
Importantly, the reservation prices (RP) of 25.00 (OV of 0.0%) in Treatment
LINEAR and 39.40 (OV of 57.6%) in Treatment CONVEX are not statistically
dierent from the experimentally observed price levels (one sample median test
{ Wilcoxon signed-rank test: z=0.314, p=0.7532, N=6 for Treatment LINEAR
and z=0.734, p=0.4631, N=6 for Treatment CONVEX). Thus, the observed
prices are a rational response to the applied incentives. It is remarkable that
under convex incentives, subjects quickly recognize the shift of the optimal
trading price and bid up prices to their reservation level.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we used laboratory asset markets to examine whether option-like
incentives lead to dierent price dynamics and trading behavior. We observed
(i) overvalued prices when subjects were endowed with option-like incentives.
Furthermore, we found (ii) that subjects, when incentivized option-like, showed
subgroups. Therefore, we refrain from providing a clear benchmark for Treatment HYBRID.
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a dierent trading behavior and took on signicantly more risk than subjects
with linear incentives. We concluded that (iii) trading at overvalued prices
and taking on excessive risks were rational for traders with convex incentives.
Due to the convexity of option-like incentives trading at these prices increases
traders' expected payouts. Although rational from a trader perspective, overval-
ued assets are harmful for other \market participants": (1) Investors frequently
delegate their portfolio to investment managers with convex incentives. These
investors, however, face a linear incentive structure and therefore carry the losses
of buying overvalued assets. Furthermore, (2) the real economy and society as
a whole suer losses as asset prices do no longer reect discounted future cash
ows and therefore ecient allocation of scarce resources is harmed. For in-
stance, these inated prices might especially be problematic when a sucient
number of option-like incentivized traders inate prices of commodities, leading
to distortions in several industrial sectors.
We further extend existing literature along three dimensions. First, we con-
tribute to the literature on whether option-like incentives lead to a risk-shifting
problem and asset overvaluation as argued by Allen and Gorton (1993). Our
experimental results suggest that when subjects have convex incentives, they
quickly recognize the risk-shifting problem and bid up prices close to their in-
dividual reservation price. Thus, we arrive experimentally at similar results as
Allen and Gorton (1993).
Second, earlier experimental studies on asset overvaluation mainly discuss
irrational explanations such as capital-gains trading (Smith et al., 1988), spec-
ulation (Lei et al., 2001) or confusion (Kirchler et al., 2012). Except the studies
of James and Isaac (2000) and Isaac and James (2003) little is known about
the role of incentives on price formation in experimental asset markets. We
contribute to this line of literature by documenting rational overvaluation.
Third, our research is in line with the claim of Rajan (2006) that one of
the main origins of instability in highly developed nancial markets are convex
incentives of market participants. Compared to the 1970s the reduced downside
15
and strongly increased upside potentials of investment managers' compensa-
tion create stronger incentives to take risks. Consequently, this increases the
likelihood that managerial incentives are not always aligned with the investors'
interests and these misalignments may result in distortions such as mispricing
of assets.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Additional Analysis
Table A1 provides other descriptive market variables. Share turnover (ST )
is applied as a measure of trading volume, the average bid-ask-spread as a
percentage of the ED in the market (SPREAD), and the standard deviation
of log-returns (SD RET ) as a proxy volatility in the various markets. Table
A2 shows the results. In particular, treatments show moderate dierences in
these variables. However, we detect no signicant dierences between any of
the investigated variables.
Table A1: Additional market variables: Share turnover (ST), bid-ask-spread
(SPREAD), and standard deviation of log-returns (SD RET).
Measure calculation
Share turnover ST =
PN
p=1 V OLp=TSO
Relative spread SPREAD = 1
N
PN
p=1 SPREADp=EDp
Standard deviation of log-returns SD RET =
q
1
T
PT
t=1(Rt  R)2
Notes: ED = expected terminal dividend. V OLp = trading volume in period
p; TSO = total shares outstanding; SPREADp = (volume-weighted) mean
dierence between best bid and best ask at every trade t in period p; N =
total number of periods; Rt = ln(Pt=(Pt 1)); T = total number of trades; R
= average log return.
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Table A2: Top panel: Treatment averages of ST, SPREAD, and SD RET. Other
panels: Pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests for ST, SPREAD, and SD RET (z-
values and p-values in parenthesis are provided). Sample size N of each test
equals 12.
Treatment ST SPREAD SD RET
LINEAR 2.761 0.091 0.043
CONVEX 2.467 0.129 0.046
HYBRID 2.311 0.0849 0.035
ST CONVEX HYBRID
LINEAR 0.160 0.961
(0.8728) (0.3367)
CONVEX 0.961
(0.3367)
SPREAD CONVEX HYBRID
LINEAR 1.441 0.320
(0.1495) (0.7488)
CONVEX 1.601
(0.1093)
SD RET CONVEX HYBRID
LINEAR 0.160 0.641
(0.8728) (0.5218)
CONVEX 0.801
(0.4233)
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1%
signicance levels of a double-sided test.
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Appendix B: Individual Market Data
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Figure A1: Expected terminal dividend (ED, bold line) and individual transac-
tion prices in all markets of Treatment LINEAR.
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Figure A2: Expected terminal dividend (ED, bold line) and individual transac-
tion prices in all markets of Treatment CONVEX.
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Figure A3: Expected terminal dividend (ED, bold line) and individual transac-
tion prices in all markets of Treatment HYBRID.
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Appendix C: Experimental Instructions
Instructions for Treatment LINEAR and Treatment HYBRID13
General Information
This experiment is concerned with replicating an asset market where traders
can trade assets of a ctive company for 8-15 consecutive periods - with equal
probability of termination for each period.
Market Description
The market consists of ten traders. Each trader gets an initial endowment of
40 assets (to be precise: 40 units of ONE asset) and a working capital of 2000
Taler (experimental currency). In every period you can sell and/or buy assets,
and your asset and Taler holdings are transferred to the next trading period,
respectively. Each trading period automatically terminates after two minutes.
Dividends, Holding Costs, and Buyback of the Assets
At the end of each period you have to pay 1 Taler of holding costs for each asset
you hold. Additionally, at the end of each trading period, you get a dividend
for each asset you hold. The dividend is drawn randomly and can take on the
following values.
Dividend for each Probability of
asset in Taler the dividend
0 50%
2 50%
Your dividend earnings and holding costs during the course of the experiment
are directly transferred to a savings account. Thus, the sum of holding costs
and dividends for each asset is -1 or 1 with equal probability. All traders in the
market get the information in the table mentioned above.
13Instructions and screenshots are for Treatment LINEAR. In Treatment HYBRID the
subjects with linear incentives received the same instruction as for Treatment LINEAR except
one sentence mentioned below in bold.
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At the end of the experiment (after 8-15 periods) the assets you own are bought
back by the experimenter. The buyback price is determined randomly and can
take on the following values (all traders in the market get the information in
the table mentioned below).
Probability of the buyback prices:
Buyback price for Probability of
each asset in Taler the buyback price
15 80%
65 20%
Savings Account
Your dividend earnings received and your holding costs paid during the experi-
ment are directly transferred to a savings account. At the end of the experiment
the value of your savings account is added to your payo (see below).
Trading
Trade is accomplished in form of a double auction, i.e., each trader can appear as
buyer and seller at the same time. You can submit any quote of assets with prices
ranging from 0 to a maximum of 999 Taler (with at most two decimal places).
For every quote you make, you have to enter the number of assets you intend
to trade as well. Note that your Taler and asset holdings cannot drop below
zero. If you buy assets, your Taler holdings will be diminished by the respective
expenditures (price x quantity) and the number of assets will be increased by
the quantity of newly bought assets. Inversely, if you sell assets, your Taler
holdings will be increased by the respective revenues (price x quantity) and the
number of assets will be decreased by the quantity of newly sold assets.
Calculation of your Earnings (payo) in EUR
Your payo at the end of the experiment (after 8-15 periods) is calculated as
follows:
PAYOFF in EUR = WEALTH IN TALER / EXCHANGE RATE
Your wealth in Taler is the number of assets you hold multiplied by the buy-
back price plus your Taler holdings plus your inventory on the savings account.
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WEALTH IN TALER = ASSETS * BUYBACK PRICE + TALER + SAV-
INGS ACCOUNT
Your wealth in Taler will be exchanged into EUR at an exchange rate of 100
Taler = 0.5 EUR at the end of the experiment. So, you will get 5 EUR for every
1000 Taler in wealth.
Payo structure:
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Pa
yo
ff 
in
 E
UR
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Wealth in Taler
Payoff LINEAR
Example 1: At the end of the experiment you have 45 assets, 1700 in Taler
and 100 Taler on your savings account. The randomly drawn buyback price is
65. Wealth in EUR: 45*65+1700+100=4725; 4725/200=23.6 (see above in the
graph) Payo in EUR: 23.6
Example 2: At the end of the experiment you have 45 assets, 1700 in Taler
and 100 Taler on your savings account. The randomly drawn buyback price is
15. Wealth in EUR: 45*15+1700+100=2475; 2475/200=12.4 (see above in the
graph) Payo in EUR: 12.4
Important Information
 Please note that some traders have a dierent payo function.
 Your current ctive payos in EUR under both buyback prices are listed
in the history screen (see below)
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 Each trading period lasts for 120 seconds.
 Use the full stop (.) as decimal place.
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Instructions for Treatment CONVEX and Treatment HYBRID14
General Information
This experiment is concerned with replicating an asset market where traders
can trade assets of a ctive company for 8-15 consecutive periods - with equal
probability of termination for each period.
Market Description
The market consists of ten traders. Each trader gets an initial endowment of
40 assets (to be precise: 40 units of ONE asset) and a working capital of 2000
Taler (experimental currency). In every period you can sell and/or buy assets,
and your asset and Taler holdings are transferred to the next trading period,
respectively. Each trading period automatically terminates after two minutes.
Dividends, Holding Costs, and Buyback of the Assets
At the end of each period you have to pay 1 Taler of holding costs for each asset
you hold. Additionally, at the end of each trading period, you get a dividend
for each asset you hold. The dividend is drawn randomly and can take on the
following values.
Dividend for each Probability of
asset in Taler the dividend
0 50%
2 50%
Your dividend earnings and holding costs during the course of the experiment
are directly transferred to a savings account. Thus, the sum of holding costs
and dividends for each asset is -1 or 1 with equal probability. All traders in the
market get the information in the table mentioned above.
At the end of the experiment (after 8-15 periods) the assets you own are bought
back by the experimenter. The buyback price is determined randomly and can
14Instructions and screenshots are for Treatment CONVEX. In Treatment HYBRID the
subjects with convex incentives received the same instruction as for Treatment CONVEX
except one sentence mentioned below in bold.
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take on the following values (all traders in the market get the information in
the table mentioned below).
Probability of the buyback prices:
Buyback price for Probability of
each asset in Taler the buyback price
15 80%
65 20%
Savings Account
Your dividend earnings received and your holding costs paid during the experi-
ment are directly transferred to a savings account. At the end of the experiment
the value of your savings account is added to your payo (see below).
Trading
Trade is accomplished in form of a double auction, i.e., each trader can appear
as buyer and seller at the same time. You can submit any quote of assets with
prices ranging from 0 to a maximum of 999 Taler (with at most two decimal
places). For every quote you make, you have to enter the number of assets you
intend to trade as well. Note that your Taler and asset holdings cannot drop
below zero. If you buy assets, your Taler holdings will be diminished by the
respective expenditures (price x quantity) and the number of assets will be in-
creased by the quantity of newly bought assets. Inversely, if you sell assets, your
Taler holdings will be increased by the respective revenues (price x quantity)
and the number of assets will be decreased by the quantity of newly sold assets.
Calculation of your Earnings (payo) in EUR
Your payo at the end of the experiment (after 8-15 periods) is calculated as
follows:
PAYOFF in EUR = WEALTH IN TALER + FIXED PAYMENT
Your wealth in Taler is the number of assets you hold multiplied by the buyback
price plus your Taler holdings plus your inventory on the savings account.
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WEALTH IN TALER = ASSETS * BUYBACK PRICE + TALER + SAVINGS
ACCOUNT
If your wealth in Taler is above 3000 Taler you will get 7 (2.1875 ) EUR for
every 100 Taler exceeding 3000 Taler. In addition you will get a xed payment
of 8 EUR as well. If your wealth is below 3000 Taler, you will only get the xed
payment of 8 EUR.
Payo structure:
0
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UR
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Wealth in Taler
Payoff CONVEX
Example 1: At the end of the experiment you have 45 assets, 1700 in Taler
and 100 Taler on your savings account. The randomly drawn buyback price is
65. Wealth in EUR: 45*65+1700+100=4725; (4725-3000)*0.021875=37.7 (see
above in the graph) Fixed payment in EUR: 8 Payo in EUR: 37.7+8=45.7
Example 2: At the end of the experiment you have 45 assets, 1700 in Taler
and 100 Taler on your savings account. The randomly drawn buyback price
is 15. Wealth in EUR: 0 (your wealth (45*15+1700+100=2475) is lower than
3000) Fixed payment in EUR: 8 Payo in EUR: 0+8=8
Important Information
 Please note that some traders have a dierent payo function.
 Your current ctive payos in EUR under both buyback prices are listed
in the history screen (see below)
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 Each trading period lasts for 120 seconds.
 Use the full stop (.) as decimal place.
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